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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

OF FACTS

The jury below returned a verdict against respondent of no cause of action. On motion made by plaintiff
below, the trial court granted a new trial as against
the several appellants, the latter appealing the order
granting the motion. This appeal is to test the right
of the trial court in granting the new trial.
Appellants statement of the facts is extremely onesided. On a question arising in an appellate court as
to the jurisdiction and use of discretion by a trail court
as to the latter's disposition of a motion for a new
trial, the sole inquiry of the appellate court is whether
there was any competent evidence which would support a verdict in favor of the moving party.

Stack v. Kearnes, 221 P2d 594.
King v. Union Pacific R:y., 212 P2d 692.
The ·facts as hereinafter stated are set forth to
meet the test of the Stack, and the King cases. An
elaborate review of all of the lengthy facts is thus not
required.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent Uptown Appliance 'and Radio Company, Inc. ·was formed in November 1947 to do an appliance business and was operated by four men, three
of whom had had business experience. (R. 681) The
fourth was a certified public accountant.

(R. 1412)
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They opened '"hat the distributor for sevPral western
states of R.C_._-\_ products ralled a beautiful store at 32
South ~lain Street in Salt Lake (R. 535) and commenced business 'Yith seyeral lines of appliance goods.
(R. 686, 689, 693, 696, 711, 720) Their business grew
rapidly and by midsurnn1er of 1948 it was the largest
RCA account in the territory. (R. 539) The defendant
Flint stated to the '"'itness Earl it was one of his best
accounts. Respondent did a gross business during 6
months of 1948 of almost $225,000.00. (Exhibit AAA)
Until the conspiracy got under way in December 1948
the company al\\~ays paid its bills. (R. 541)
In X ovember 1948 respondent opened a store on
State Street called Radio City (R. 714) and also a
warehouse outlet on Pierpont Street. (R. 722) From
early summer until December of 1948 some dealers,
including the defendant dealers herein, became concerned about respondent and its prices. (R. 748, 750, 981,
986, 1066, 1068,1070) Respondent sold goods at reduced
prices. Its warehouse price-discount operation was particularly odious to defendant Royle, (R. 1999) Mr.
Bennett of ZC1II, (R. 985) and of eoneern to defendants
<Jraybar and the Paris Co. (R. 772, 1068) Defendant
Flint had conversations -vvith Mr. Bennett and Mr.
Dreyfous of Paris Co. in December, at the time of respondent's diffieulties, in W'hich both Bennett and Dreyfous exprPssed concern or dissatisfaction about price

li c· i es of respondent. ( R. 1069, 9~i5) ) Defendent N ev-

p1 1
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ins, operating the leased appliance departments of ZCMI
and Keith 0 'Brien Co. complained many times to Ben.nett and others about the prices and policies of respondents "across the street" (R. 982)
The Pierpont warehouse was an inexpensive outlet
located in relatively unimproved quarters in the warehouse district (R. 729) of Salt Lake City, and merchandise was sold at cost plus a mark up reflecting sales
expense plus a margin for profit, passing the savings
on to the consumer. (R. 733, 743) Arrangements were
made with large groups of consumers through their
leaders to purchase. Contacts were made by respondent with Geneva Steel employees association (R. 730),
Utah Oil, and Wasatch Oil employees (R. 731), Safeway employees, Navy Base and Hill Field employees,
the Teamsters Union, and the Utah Federation of Credit
Unions. (R. 735) For a period of seven weeks prior
. to the working out of the conspiracy, the Pierpont store
flourished. ( R. 744)
Ed Moreau, a department head of Flint, warned
respondent in November 1948 the latter "\\Tere to be
"shopped," (R. 750) and on November 8th or 9th the
Paris Co. made fro1n Uptown a purchase of a Zenith
radio at a discount. (R. 1149, 2149, Ex. CCC) The sales
slip of the "Rammelmeyer purchase" was given by
Dreyfous of the Paris Co. to Flint.

(R. 1876, 1075)

Flint's m•an Moreau immediately ·confronted respondent with the sales slip stating Flint was in difficulty
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'vith the Paris Co., that a meeting vYas required by Flint
'vho supplied respondent 'Yith considerable of its merchandise. (R. 101:2) Two days later, December 12, at the
meeting held at Flint's, defendant Flint admonished respondent about its policy of cutting prices ~below those
generally follo,Yed, stating that if it didn't quit, it
'Yould be destroyed in 90 days, its lines taken away, its
credit connections destroyed, that dealers were even
then meeting to decide the fate of respondent. (R. 1015,
756)
On Decernber 15th representatives of defendants
Flint and Graybar at different times called on respondent and dicussed the objectionable price methods of respondent's merchandising. (R. 760, 762)
On December 16th Flint's represtenatives called,
advising of the cancellation of all Flint lines of merchandise supply except two, and by Christmas virtually all
of Flint's merchandise had been returned. (R. 768, 1872,
984) When Flint had shown his hostility to 'appellant,
threating its downfall and cancelling Bendix washers,
Kelvinator refrigerators, and Fowler water heaters,
respondent had no confidence to continue with its Zenith
and Columbia lines. ( R. 930)
On December 17th defendants Flint and Nevin went·
to Bennett of ZCMI 'and told him of the Pierpont store~
and its methods of discounting prices. Flint said Bennett as head of a retail store, should know what was

'
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really going on. (R. 985) Flint testifie,d he told Bennett he had terminated his sale of merchandise to respondent; said he: ''I am not going to sell to them.''
( R. 1872, 985)
Within a few days Bennett caused a cancellation of
business relations with respondent, who had sold a very
large volume of Easy washers supplied theretofore by
ZCMI. · (R. 773, 986) The representatives of ZCMI, in
relating the circumstances of the cessation of business,
stated that Flint was the source of the trouble. (R.
733) All ZCMI merchandise had been returned by J·anuary 8th 1949, (R. 779)
On Deeember 20th a representative of defendant
Graybar, Mr. Searle, told respondent that all his dealers
were complaining about them, and that the Pierpont
store must be closed or there could be no more supplying of Hotpoint merchandise. (R. 772)
On December 2.2 or 23, Graybar's man advised respondent Nevins had called the manager asking if he
intended to continue to sell Uptown (R. 774, 2080) reporting further that Standard Supply had made the
same current inquiry, the latter selling Uptown radio
instruments and records.
'During this time respondent employed a coupon
book for the sale of phonograph records whereby a purchaser paying $20 cash for a book received $25 worth
of .record·s. (R. 993, 780 A) During this time defendants
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Royle, Bigelow·, the Paris Co., and Nevins all complained
to the RCA Victor distributor about the practice, and
later had a meeting in the Hotel Utah which included
that subject for discussion. (R. 991, 591, 593, 595, 597)
All these dealers put pressure on the RCA distributor
to either discontinue selling records to Uptown or he
"~auld ha-v-e to buy back their record inventory which
entail about $80,000.00. (R. 557, 559, 5'61, 595, 1025)
As an alternative, the dealers would advertise Victor
records at great discount, the Paris discount being possibly 40%. (R. 596) The Victor distributor was told this
would break him. (R. 595)
Concurrently Uptown bought Decca records from
defendant Salt Lake Hardware; and defendant Royle
telephoned l\IcKee, the representative of Salt Lake Hardware, asking if the company was aware that Uptown
-was also using the coupon book to sell Decca records at
a discount. (R. 944 A) Defendant Nevin's man Crowton
called l\1cKee also. Because of dealer pressure, the RCA
distributor induced Uptown to cease to use the coupon
book. ( R. 592)
On January 4th the department head of Graybar
ealled on Uptown, stating he had been that day at one of
the largest Hotpoint dealers in town; that the only way
he could leave Hotpoint in Uptown was for Uptown to
conform to retail prices, and that respondent could sell
no merchandise below the suggested retail price. (R.
1159) The Pierpont store had. been closed because of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the prior demand of the Hotpoint representative (Gray..
bar) and its inducement to quit the warehous·e opera..
tion, (R. 772).
On January 4, 1949, Jules Dreyfous decided to call
a meeting of the dealers to discuss Uptown's price policies. (R. 1077) He made arrangements for the meeting
at Hotel Utah, and called defendant Bigelow requesting
the latter to invite certain other dealers (R. 1078) which
the latter did. Dreyfous personally invited Bennett of
ZCMI, who attended to represent ZCMI and defendant
Nevins. (R. 989) On January 5th the meeting was held.
Ten persons were present including all of the dealer
defendants. (R. 991) Dreyfous· opened the meeting explaining that Uptown was selling records at a discount,
and was price cutting. (R. 992) Radio instruments were
discussed, and Mr. Bennett explained that he ceased to
sell Easy washers to Uptown; (R. 992) there was talk
about respondent violating a fair trade agreement on
Victor records. Lawyer Nebeker was called in by Dreyfous who explained the fair trade law, observing that
the dealers as a group should do nothing about the matter as it would have the appearance of a "conspiracy."
(R. 997) Someone was delegated to ·call on the RCA
distributor Earl. (R. 997)
Dreyfous called on the RCA distributor immediately
after stating to him that Uptown was selling records and
Zenith :radio instruments 'a.t a discount and that he was
going to do something about it. (R. 598) He stated
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that '• other dealers feel the same way about it." "You
have my ultiinatum; you either take the Uptown Appliance Company ou.t of business, or I am going to discount and sell the RCA Victor records that I own" and
the discount would not be any 25%. (R. 597, 598) Defendent Bigelow testified Dreyfous was ready to run an
ad discounting the records 40%. (R. 563)
1

Im1nediately after the meeting, Bennett sent a shopper to Uptown who purchased records at a discount,
(R. 999) sending them and the evidence to defendent
Nevin's department f.or keeping. (R. 1000) After the
shopping girl told Bennett she could also purchase Decca
records at a discount, Mr. Bennett immediately telephoned Mr. Wheeler, President of the defendant Salt
Lake Hardware advising him of the discount facts. (R.
1001), further stating Uptown's practice was "disrupting." (R. 1910) Mr. Wheeler testified respondent's
price cutting "upset the market." (R. 1914) Decca
records were not £~air-traded (R. 1914); Victor were.
S.oon thereafter Salt Lake Hardware acted in double
fashion. (Since the trial the U. S. Supreme Court has
thrown out as unlawful the type of fair trading practice
involved in this case. Schwegm.ann Brothers v. Calvert
Distillers, 340 U.S. 925, 71 S. Ct. 491
At this time, Mr. Ellis Wheeler treasurer of Salt
Lake Hardware, telephoned Mr. Van Winkle, office manager of Strevell-Paterson Finance, with whom Uptown
had done over $100,000.00 of finance business, and asked
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¥an Winkle if he knew ''that to promote their sales
that Uptown Appliance was cutting prices." He then
further stated that ''it was his opinion that in view of
the fact that appliance merchandise was still ·critical
during that particular time, that it was unwise from a
merchandising standpoint, to cut prices." (R. 964)
,On January lOth, defendant Bigelow, operating the
leased appliance department of Auerbach's telephoned
the RCA distributor three times importuning him to
cease to sell Uptown, stating that the de alers had all
been together to force him not to sell Uptown. (R. 1023)
He stated that the process to be followed by the dealers
~rould put Earl the distributor out of business. (R. 1025)
1

On January 11th Bennett of. ZCMI was called upon
by defendant Flint who stated.he had heard the ZCMI
had t•aken Easy washers out of Uptown; Flint wanted
to know if it was true and when it was done. (R. 998)
Bennett related to Flint the fa·cts, stating he had deprived Upto,vn of Easy washers -a few day prior. (R.
1880)
On January 12th, Salt Lake H~ardware advised Uptown that they would be sold no more Decca record~,
(R. 780) and the existing stock was immediately taken
back. (R. 783) Just prior thereto Mr. McKee of Salt
Lake Hardware had bad a conversation with Nevin's
department head in ZCMI about respondent's price cutting, and McKee had assured that department head ''-vve
will -vvork the matter out to the best ·of everyone's feel-
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ing~."

(R. 956) ~On another occasion at about this same
time Xevins phoned :\lr. Price, salesmanager of Salt
Lake Hardware and objected to Uptown having Decca
rero rds to sell. ( R. 783)
1

On the same January 12th Mr. Earl and the factory
representative from RCA Victor, Mr. Bullock, visited
all the record dealers in Salt Lake to .discuss Uptown
price cutting. ~lr. Dreyfous of Paris Co. stated to them
that ~'he would absolutely not talk to us on any kind of
compromise basis; th,at either we take out the Uptown
Appliance Company or we could buy back his stock.''
(R. 557) Defendant Royle stated that as long as Earl
sold to Uptown, he wanted no dealing with Earl, and
that Earl could buy back his stock. (R. 559) Defendant
~evins stated: ''As long as those guys across the street
are in business I am not in teres ted in doing business
W'ith you on RCA Victor records." (R. 561) Defendant
Bigelow of Auerbach's stated he knew the Paris Co. was
to run a 40% discount add Qn Victor records and this
\Vould hurt Eia.rl 's business. (R. 563) Just two days
before Bigelow had importuned Earl by phone to cancel
Uptown's buying privileges, (R. 1023) stating the dealers had all been together.
1

On January 13th the RCA Victor distributor determined to cease selling records to Uptown and advised all the defendants dealers to that effect, each
of "\-Vhom expressed approval for his action, (R. 601,
605, 606) not\\rithstanding the account to be cancelled
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was the best account in the whole territory. (R. 539)
On January 20th the supplier of Capitol, Mercury
and London records and Stromberg-Ciarlson radios
refused to sell Uptown ·any more merchandise.
On February 7th Graybar announced their unwillingness to sell respondent more merchandise, even
for cash (R. 788, 790, 793). Graybar knew of the
loss by plaintiff of all the other sources for merchandise, and had been told the loss of Hotpoint would
me'an the end of respondent's business. (R. 790, 2075)
Defendant Graybar stated as the only reason for the
decision, the financial condition of Uptown, with the
reply from the latter that their credit position was
much sounder than when Graybar had started to sell
to them initially. (R. 792) When Hotpoint was removed,
Uptown had no more appliance merchandise and started
to liquidate (R. 795 ), and dispose of its fixtures, lease,
trucks, etc.
In the last six-month period before the conspiracy
began to reflect its effect, respondent did a business
of almost a quarter of ~a million dollars. (Ex. AAA)
Each distributor-defendant put evidence in the
record that Uptown had a perfect right to sell at
whatever prices it chose : Uptown ''could sell at any
price they saw fit." (R. 1915) Flint testified he had
no reason to disapprove the merchandising policies of
Uptown, (R. 1873) yet he later stated he was opposed
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to the Pierpont store, (R. 1883) repeating it to Bennett. ( R. 985)

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The trial court had jurisdiction to grant a
new trial to respondent.
2.

A conspiracy between the defendants was

fully proven at the trial.
3.

The granting of a new trial was neither arbi-

trary, capricious, nor an abuse of discretion but was
based on a sound exercise of legal authority.

ARGUMENT

I.
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO GRANT
A NEW TRIAL TO RESPONDENT.

The principal argument of appellants brief beginning at page 24 is that the trial court, by an invalid
usurpation of power, granted ·a new trial to respondent.
Their argument is bottomed on the proposition that
the trial court did not ascribe reasons within the
precise words of the new rules, and the reasons given
are beyond the pale and without power to effect the
new trial. This argument is wholly without merit.
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It is als~o submitted that the last ~and most authoritative decision of this court is based on a record
where the court below granted a motion for a new
trial without giving any reason therefor.

Stack v. Kearnes, 221 P2d 594.
In the King case, post, the appellant quarrelled
about the grounds upon which the lower court had
granted the motion for a new trial, but the court
paid no heed to such an argument.
In a line of cases hereinafter treated, the doctrine
IS aptly st~a.ted that the motion for a new trial will
not be disturbed if it could have been properly granted
upon any of the grounds asked for by the maker of
the motion.
We will take the position here that the words used
by the trial court below are of no consequence ; and
that the trial court in granting the motion used
. appropriate words within the meaning and import of
the ne\v rules.
Respondent, 1n moving for a new trial, cited 22
reasons therefo·r including those required by the rules
and those stated by the trial court. ( R. 146, 161)
Q·uESTION DECIDED

BY

UTAH SuPREME CouRT

The Utah rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 59) set
forth the essential terms and conditions under which
a new trial may be given. Said rules follow substan-
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tially the rode "rhich has been in effect in Utah for
many years, and which were taken almost bodily from
the California Code of Civil Procedure.

King v. Union Pacific Ry., 212 P2 692.
This court in the King case and later in Stack
v. Kearnes, 221 P2 594 reviewed the law on the
"breadth of the trial court's discretion in granting a
new trial'' and found it had a wide discretion.
To review exhaustively these recent cases would
be a needless expense here. They constitute a profound
utterance clearly announcing principles found to exist
in Utah and California law, as well as the roots of
the Common La\Y for centuries. The King case reviews
the lTtah decisions and calls attention to cardi:n·al
rules to be here followed :
In one of its earliest cases this court announced that where the testimony is conflicting,
the granting or refusing of a new trial rests
peculiarly within the discretion of the trial
court.

Newton v. Brown, 2 Utah 126.
Where there is a substantial conflict of evidence on a material issue we will not review
the discretion exercised by the trial court in
granting a new trial.
Davis v. Utah Southern Ry. Co., 3 Utah 218.
2 P. 521.
Again in Utah Sta1te National Bwnk v. Livingston, 69 Utah 284, 254 P. 281, this court apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plied the same· rule and upheld a trial court
which had granted a new trial where the evidenc.e was conflicting upon an essential issue
of the case.

Thompson v. Bown Liv·e S'tock, 74 Utah 1, 276
P. 651.
This court then reviewed in the King case the
California decisions which are carried automatically
into our law with the enactment of the California
civii code. This court said in that analysis :
From an examination of the California decisions, it is apparent that the trial courts of
that state possess a wide latitude in granting
motions f.or new trials . . . .
In California it is not an abuse of discretion f.or a trial court to grant a new trial
upon the grounds of insufficient evidence to
justify the verdict :
( 1) Where there is a conflict in the evidence or where there is substantial evidence
which would support a judgment in favor of
the party asking for a new trial,
(2) unless a decision in favor of the moving party would have no legal support in the
evidence,
( 3) when the evidence is conflicting upon
the issues to be decided since the trial court
is ''at liberty to find either w~ay'' on the motion;
also when the evidence is not conflicting, and
all the proof seems to be favorable to one or
the other of the parties litigant, since the trial
court must determine the question as to the
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'·probatiYe force or evidentiary value of the
testimony'',
(4) even where there is sufficient evidence
to support the judgment on appeal had the new
trial been denied. (Note : the following are the
cases cited in the l(ing decision for the above
doctrines:

Union Oil v. Hane, 34 Cal. App. 2d '689, 94 P2d
387
Ronza 'Wine v. Hardware Mutual Ins., 31 Cal.
App. 2d 455, 88 P2d 260
Erickson r. Grady, 119 Cal. App. 596, 6 P2d 1002
Lave-rne v. Dold, 17 Cal. App. 2d 180, 61 P2d 497
J( ehlor v. Satte-rlee, 37 Cal. App. 2d 116, 98 P2d
759
Glascock v. Watters, 136 Cial. App. 713, 29 P2d
434
The Rose v. Carte-r case, 29 Cal. App. 2d 191, 84
P2d 174, cited with approval in the King case, is an
example of the treatment needed in the case at bar,
where defendant got a verdict. The appell~ate court
observed the evidence against said defendant was but
slight. The court further stated that the defendant's
appeal was by no means unjustified or without merit,
stating that there wa.s
''a generous abundance of evidence in support
of the jury's verdict. Indeed, in the light of the
record, any other verdict could scarcely have
been expected. Nevertheless the law is well settled that insufficiency of the evidence to justify
a verdict is a ground for a new trial which is
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peculiarly within the discretion of the trial
court and its order either granting or denying
a new trial will not be disturbed on appeal,
unless it appears there was a manifest abuse of
discretion. ''
With but ''slight evidence'' against the defendant
he was required to undergo a new trial. In the c31se
at bar, the court will be impressed, to say the least,
with respondent's evidence that there was prima facie
evidence of a conspiracy, whether the jury believed
it or not.

Prout v. Perkins, 69 P2d 194.
The most recent declaration ·of this court on the
question of the dis·cretion of the trial court to act on
a motion for a new trial is S'tack v . Kearnes, 221 P2d
594; there the trial court goes one step further than
in the King case and grants the motion without giving any reason for so doing, a practice evidently
unanimously approved by _this court.

The opinion

observed, as to the holding in the King case :
We held that where there appears in the
record competent evidence which would support
a verdict in favor of the party moving for a
new trial, there is no abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court in granting a new trial
upon that ground.
Many cases have held that where there is substantial competent evidence, the trial court is fully
authorized, and indeed it is its duty to grant the
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motion, if in its judgment justice has not been done
by the verdict.
But here \Ye have our own Utah court going
further in 1950 and approving the action of the trial
court in the absence of any reason!s given by the
trial court in granting the motion, and when there is
but ''competent evidence,'' to say nothing of the
standard of substantial, or uncontradicted evidence.
Certainly the trial court had jurisdiction.
In the well-reasoned case of Campanella v. Campanella~, 269 P. 433, 1928, the supreme court of California lays down the important rule respecting the
'• general'' language used · by the trial court in the
case at bar, as distinguished from specific words
contended for:
It is the well established rule ·of this court
that when the order of the trial court in granting a new trial is general in its terms, it will
be affirmed if it could properly have been·
granted upon any of. the grounds upon which
· the motion for it wa·s predicated. (Cases.) It is
an equally well-settled and long-established rule
of this court that an order granting .a new trial
will not be disturbed upon appeal, except upon
a showing of clear and manifest abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in respect
to granting the same.

Scott v. Times-Mirror Co., 174 P. 312
Weiseer v. 8. P. Co., 83 P. 439, 148 Cal. 426
Morgan v. J. W. Robinson Co. 107 P. 695
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In the Morgan v. J. 'W. Robinson case, supra, the
trial court was unanim·ously affirmed by the California
supreme court where the lower court had used the
general language that the new trial '' i:s ordered to be
and the same is hereby granted;'' thus no reason was
given, as in the Stack case. Note also in the W eiseer
case, supra, the· supreme court of California stated:
It is the duty of the trial court to grant
a new trial on such ground (insufficiency of
evidence) whenever the judge is convinced that
the verdict is clearly aga.inst the weight of the
evidence . . . (Italics added.)
In the Scott case, supra, the motion was made as
in the case at bar on the grounds stated in the statute,
but the motion was granted by the trial court in
general terms: The Supreme Court of California stated:
It is the well-settled rule of this court that
when the order of the trial court in granting
a ne-vv trial is general in its terms it will be
affirmed if it could properly have been granted
on any grounds upon which the motion for it
was predicated. (Cased cited.)
The specious nature of appellants argument of
lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to grant a new
trial is -vvell illustrated by reference to the

pract~ce

in Idaho where the same statutory reasons for giving
a new trial are in effect as in Utah and California.
1 Idaho Code Annotated 1932, 485, and 2 Idaho Code 656.
The Idaho Supreme Court in MacDonald v. Ogan,
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104 P2d 1106 took occasion to state, in a ca.se where
the reason f.or the trial court granting a new trial were
not elucidated:
This appeal illustrates the great importance
of trial courts specifying the grounds on which
a new trial is granted. We have frequently
pointed out the desirability of such a p-ractice
and recommended its adoption by the ·courts.
'Vhere a motion for a new trial has been made
on several grounds and the trial court grants the
same without designating the ground upon which the
order is made, the order will not be disturbed on
appeal if it could have been granted properly on any
ground mentioned in the motion.

Gray v. Pierson, 64 P. 33, 7 Idaho 540
Penninger Lateral Co. v. Clark, 117 P. 764, 20
Idaho 166
Respondent here asked the trial court for a new
trial stating twenty-two grounds therefor, including
the grounds of the rule of "insufficiency of the evidence'' and the verdict is ag:ainst the weight of the
evidence ; ( R. 146) thus the decision of the trial
court is supported by the best of authority.
TRIAL CouE.T 's LANGUAGE AnEQUATE

It is submitted that there is great and undisputed
authority for the proposition that the language used
by the trial court was substantially within the meaning
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and powers set forth in the new rules. The trial court
stated that the "verdict is against the weight of evidence.'' The new rules, 59- ( 6), state a new trial may
be had based on ''insufficiency of the evidence.'' It
is further submitted that the two expressions mean
one and the same thing.
The terms ''insufficiency of the evidence'' require
an analysis by the trial court of the evidence, and the
weight to be given it. Such an inquiry forces consideration of the . weight of the evidence. The terms are
reciprocal. Indeed, the u·nited States Supreme Court
said in a foundation decision many years ago, since
widely followed, of the words ''against the weight'' as
being vvi thin the terms ''insufficient evidence.''
Metropolitan Railroad v. Moore, 121 U. S. 558.

The court in the same case further stated, in construing the meaning of the words, and the powers of
trial courts in applying them to the problem of granting new trials:
In. many cases it might be the duty of the
court to withdraw the case from the jury, or
to direct a verdict in a particular 'vay; and yet
in others, where it would be proper to submit
the case to the jury, it might become its duty
to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial.
That obligation, hovvever, is the result of a
conclusion of fact, and in such cases the ground
of the ruling is, that the verdict is not supported
by sufficient evidence, because it is against the
weight of the evidence .... it is admitted, also,
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that by the construction placed upon the language contained in § 804 by the courts of New
York, it includes motions to set aside a verdict
against the 1reight of evidence, as within the
phrase 'for insufficient evidence'. This was
the very p·oint deterinined in the case just
referred to of ~:l.ngeo v. Dunc.a, 39 N.Y. 313.
In .A.ngeo v. Dunca, supra, decided by the Ne'v
York Supreme Court in 1888 that court lays down the
solid and 'Yell-followed rule that there is no want of
power in the judge presiding at the trial to set :aside
a verdict rendered by a jury, when it is p-alpably
against law, or wholly and clearly unw·arranted by the
evidence. The appellate court held that .a code provision of that state granting a new trial for insufficient evidence, among other reasons, did not. by any
implication limit or abridge the power which would
exist had the code provision not been enacted.

In

other words the old New York decision is the basis
for the generalization used by many modern text's to
the effect that:
Power or .authority to order a new trial is
in its inception a common-law right, and is
inherent in all courts of general common-law
jurisdiction. . . . A statute which purports to
limit this power, being in derogation of the
common law, should be strictly construed. Nor
will a statute governing new trials be construed
to restrict the a U:thority .of the court unless the
intention of the legislature so to do is plainly
manifested. 39 Am. Jur. 34
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Inland a;nd Seaboa.rd Coasting Co.
u.s. 121

~·

Hall, 124

The California Suprem·e Court has several times
held that insufficiency of the evidence means want of
evidence as' well as contrary to the weight of the evidence.

0 amp.a.nella v. C.amp·anella, 269 P. 433
In re Bainbridges Estate, 146 P. 427
Southern Pac. L.and Co. v. Dickerson, 204 P. 576
In re Caspar's Estate, 155 P. 631.
In the Bainbridge Estate case, supra, the supreme
court of California clearly construed as similar the
meaning of the terms here under review:
In the determination of a motion for a new
trial, the verdict should be set· aside if, in the
opinion of the trial court, it is not supported
by sufficient evidence; and this is equally true
vvhether there be an absence of evidence or that
the evid.ence received, in the individual judgment
of the trial judge, is lacking in probative force
to establish the proposition of fact to vrhich it
is addressed. This is the meaning of the tern1s
''insufficiency of evidence'' and ''contrary to
evidence. ''
The narrow construction argued by the defendants
to the effect that the trial court must find for. a nevv
trial specifically within the words of the new rules
is further made ridiculous by the following quotation
appearing in the same Bainbridges Estate, supra, where
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the san1e court quotes from an earlier California decision by the same court as follows:
\\"""hile it is the exclusive province of the jury
to find the facts, it is nevertheless one of the
most important requirements of the trial judge
to see to it that this function of the jury is
intelligently and justly exercised. In this respect, 'vhile he cannot competently interfere with
or control the jury in passing upon the evidence,
he nevertheless exercises a very salutary superYisory power over their verdict. In the exercise
of that power he should always satisfy himself
that the evidence as a whole is sufficient to
sustain the verdict found, and, if in his sound
judgment it is not, he should unhesitatingly say
so, and set the verdict aside.
In the case at bar, the trial court was not at all
satisfied by the verdict as rendered. In no uncertain
"Tords it has so stated. To the court who vie,ved the
witnesses, heard and saw the entire panorama of this
most interesting and significant trial, his feelings were
so strong as to compel him to state that ''a new trial
is required to prevent a miscarriage of justice.'' Such
strong language is certainly not to be lightly looked
upon. The evidence w.a.s full. It was contested. ~on
the question of the existence of a conspiracy, it is evident that the court felt there was strong evidence
upon \vhich a jury could well find for the plaintiff'.~
even under the high standard of evidence required
under its instructions. He \Vas not satisfied that the
jury had properly understood and acted upon the eviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dence. It was clearly within his sound discretion and
duty to gr:ant a new trial under the timely motion
made by respondent.
In Weiseer v. Southern Pac. Ry., 83 P. 439, the
California Supreme Cou·rt, in upholding the granting
of a new trial against a verdict for plaintiff awarding
substantial damages, observed not only the trial court
had used but general language in granting the new
trial but specifically used the very words used by
the trial

ca~e

in the case at bar as follows:'

It is ·established by numerous decisions of
this court that, although there may be some
conflict in the testimony, it is the duty of the .
trial court to grant a new trial on such ground,
whenever the judge is convinced that the verdict
is clearly against the w-eight of the evidence, and
his action in that regard will not be disturbed
unless it is apparent that there has been an abuse
of discretion.
Attention is called to the statutory authority in
California during all of the times the above cited cases
were being decided, almost exactly similar to those
provisions stated in the new Utah Rules.

Yet the

California court has used the expression "weight of
the evidence" almost

intercha~geably

ciency of the evidence.''

with "insuffi-

Clearly the trial court in

the case at bar had the same reasoning in mind and
that with good and sufficient legal authority.
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In So·uthern Pac. Land Co. v. Dickerson, supra,
the court held:
. . . the code of Civil Procedure authorizes .a
new trial upon th·e grotmd of ''insufficiency of
the evidence to justify the verdict'' "\V hich has
been interpreted as applying not only to cases
"~here the verdict is contrary to the weight of
the evidence, but "'here there is no evidence to
support the verdict. (Citing Estate of Bainbridge,
supra, and Estate of Caspar, 172 Cal. 147. 155
Pac. 631.

In Re Caspar's Estate, supra, notwithstanding
there \Yas in existence the same civil rules governing
the granting of new trials, the Supreme Court of
California found in 1916 as follows:
In this state, though the evidence pro and
con upon the issues be substantial and conflicting,
it is the duty of the trial judge to set aside a
verdict at least once if his conviction is that that
verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence.
Emrnons v. Sheldon, 26 Wis. 648
Appellants' brief at page 27 states "there is no
authority for setting aside a verdict because the trial
judge thinks it is against the weight of the evidence.''
Nothing could be further from the truth.
This court's opinion in the King case gives with
approval a long analysis of Nelson v. Angelus Hospital

Assn., 23 Cal. App. 2d 71, 72 P2d 169 quoting at length.
Both expressions used by the trial court in the case
at ba.r appear profusely in the King case in the cases
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quoted therein. The Utah court quoted the California
court as follows :
To the contrary, notwithstanding any such
conflict, or even though the apparent weight of
the evidence should be in support of the verdict
or ·decision, since it is the personal duty of the
trial judge to weigh and consider the evidence
and to reach a just conclusion thereon, if he be
satisfied that the verdict or decision in question
is not in fact supported by the evidence, or that
it is contrary to the weight of the evidence, he
is not only authorized, but it is his bounden
duty to grant the motion for new trial. 30 Cal.
Jur. 117. . .. all that is required to sustain it
is the fact that the record discloses substantial
evidence in support of the conclusion that has
been reached by the trial court in that respect.
The same King opinio~ quotes with approval the
following language from Garrison v. U.S., 62 F2d 41,
using both the expressions appearing in Judge J eppson 's order granting a new trial:
Where there is substantial evidence in support of the plaintiff's case, the judge may not
direct a verdict against him even though he
may not believe his evidence or think that the
"\veight of the evidence is on the other side ; for
under the constitutional guarantee of trial by
jury, it is for the jury to weigh the evidence
and pass upon its credibility. He may, however
set aside a verdict supported by substantial evidence where in his opinion it is contrary to the
clear weight of the evidence or is based upon
evidence "\\Thich is false: for even though the
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evidence be sufficient to preclude the direction
of a verdict, it is still his duty to exercise his
power oYer the proceedings before him to
prevent a JJl iscar,riage of justice.
The words ''"'"eight of the evidence is against the
decision'' used in connection with the granting of a
new trial are quoted again in the King case with approval from ll7 hitfield v. Debrincat, 96 P2d 156. Indeed the King case uses the expression almost itself
at page 698 of the decision supra as follows:
If what the defendant contends for were
the la·w·, the trial judge would have no authority
to U'eigh the evidence and decide a question of
fact.
The decision in the King case further and finally
stated in approaching the constitutional issues involved,
in quoting the United States Supreme Court in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53:

All that resulted from the granting of a
new trial "vas that the determination of the
issues upon which liability was dependent was
taken away from one jury and given to another
jury. There was no usurpation by the trial court
of the jurys' function. As was observed by
Lord Mansfield in Bright v. Eynon, 1 Burrows
390, the effect of a new trial is ''no more than
having the cause more deliberately considered
by another jury, when there is reasonable doubt
or perhaps a certainty that justice has not
been done.
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Indeed, in an annotation on the subject referred to
In the King case as 20 Cal Jur. at page 12 appears
the interesting statement that the plaintiff is entitled
to two decisions, one by the jury and another by the
court on the motion for a new trial.
Appellant would possibly undertake to mislead this
court in its reference to the holding in Valiotis v. Utah
Apex, 184 P. 802 at page 29 of its brief. That case
does not help appellant at all. It is an authority
squarely in favor of the action of the trial court belo\v
in weighing the evidence. In that case the jury had
returned a verdict for an injured plaintiff, and the
trial court refused to grant defendant :a new trial.
This court then refused to upset the verdict and the
ruling as to a nevv trial on jurisdictional grounds, and
a finding there V\Tas no abuse. of discretion.
Appellants take the position that the trial court
In passing on a motion for a new trial cannot weigh
the evidence. This court \vill have to do a great deal
of overruling if that is to be the lR\L Note the language of the \Tali otis case at page 806 :
It \Yill be perceived that counsel for appellant does not contend that there was no evi. dence to support the verdict, but that the verdict is so palpably against the clear weight of
the evidence as to indicate that the trial ·court
abused its discretion in refusing to grant a new
trial. In other words, we are asked to review
the vveight of the evidence.
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It is undoubtedly true, as counsel for a ppellant content that the trial judge n1ay and should
set aside a verdict for insufficiency of the evidence and grant a new trial whenever in his
judgment the verdict is clearly and palpably
against the ""eight of the evidence. Not to do
so would be an abuse of his discretion.
Of course the appellate court was precluded fro1n
"~eighing the evidence but it clearly stated the trial
court must. It n1ade no point as to a nice distinction
between weight of evidence and insufficiency. It treated
one as the reciprocal of the other exactly as the U.S.
Supreme Court had done years before in the cases of
"Jtletropolitan Railroad v. JJ;[ oore, 121 U.S. 558, and Inland and Seaboard Coasting Co. v. Hall, 124 U.S. 121.
, Appellants cite not a single case in or out of Utah
to show that a trial court is without jurisdiction tv
grant a new trial on the grounds asked for by respondent and given by the trial court. The only cases cited
by appellant are those where the appellate court
refused on any grounds to interfere with the discretion exercised by the trial court in not allowing a
new trial.

The James and V ali otis cases cited on

pages 28 of app·ellants brief are no authority on the
contention of appellants but support entirely the position of respondent. In fact, app·ellants cite no case in
its entire brief to support its position that the trial
court was without jurisdiction, or exceeded the pro·priety of the occasion in granting a ne\v trial.
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they have given the court is an unconvincing argument
without citation of any pertinent law. They have said
the King case is not in point and there left the~ matter
for specious argument, and reference to irrelevant matters in the record, not going to the question of whether
some, or substantial evidence was shown of a
conspiracy.
Appellants make a great deal in their brief of
the point that the court set a standard of evid.ence for
the jury of ''clear and convincing,'' yet in granting a
new trial, the court speaks of the ''weight'' of the
evidence. We do not find that appellants have presented a single authority on the pertinent subject of
inquiry f.~ this court. The issue before this court is
not the quantum of proof requir;ed for a finding for
plaintiff by the jury below. It is simply the question
of the right of the trial court under proper motion,
to grant a new trial for any lawful reason. The cases
we have presented are unanimous on the subject, and
the quantum of proof required for the jury to make
a finding has no relevance to the question at bar.
· The trial court had the discretion and wisely used it.
II.
A CONSPIRACY BETWEEN THE DEFENDANTS WAS
FULLY PROVEN AT THE TRIAL.

Defendants in the second section of their brief
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state that "Plaintiff failed to prove that a conspiracy
ever existed among the defendants or any of them.''
The trial court believed a conspiracy was proven at
the conclusion of respondent's case and denied a motion for non-suit. (R. 1708, 1712) There can be no
question but what a conspiracy was proven.
I

The court properly instructed the jury that ''under
the statutes of the State of Utah it is declared that
any combination by persons having for its object or
effect the controlling of prices of any article of manufacture or commerce is p·rohibited and declared unlawful,'' and that any person who becomes a member
of any combination, federation or understanding with
any other person ·or persons to regulate or fix the
price of any article shall be deemed guilty of a conspiracy to defraud, and shall be answerable in damages.
(R. 107) This suit was bottomed on the law as stated
in Title 73, chapter 1, UCA 1943, reflecting the mandate of Article XII section 20 of the Utah Constitution. The whole body of law enforcing the Sherman
Act of the United States Government serves as a backdrop for the nefarious drama enacted secretly by the
defendant conspirators.
The evils of price fixing are well stated in Denver .
Jobbers v. People, 122 Pac. 404, as follows:
Pools, trusts, and conspiracies to fix and
maintain the prices of the necessities of life
strike at the foundations of government; instill
a destructive poison into the life of the body
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politic; wither the energies of competitors;
blight individual investments in legitimate business; drive small and honest dealers out of
business for themselves and make them mere
hewers of wood and drawers of water for the
trust; raise the cost of living and lower the
price of wages ; take from the Average free man
the ability to supply his family with necessities
and wholesome food. . . . The wisdom and
experience of all ages and all peoples have
demonstrated the necessity for laws against
such combinations and for the rigid enforcement of them.
U.S. v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 50
AL·R 989
Johnson v. Yost, 117 F2 53
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251
EasJman Co. v. Southern Photo, 273 U.S. 359
Eastern s·tates Lumber v. U.S., 234 U.S. 600
Ball v. Paramount Pictures, 169 F2 317.
U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, 68 S. Ct. 915, 334
U.S. 131
American Tobacco v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781, 66 S. Ct.
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park Sons, 220 U.S. 373
U ..S. v. ,Griffith, 68 S. Ct. 941, 334 U.S. 100
Hale v. Hatch, 204 Fed. 433
Central Coal ·v. Hartman, 111 Fed. 96
U.S. v. Socony Vaeuum. Oil 310 U.S. 150, 60
S. Ct. 811
Straus v. Victor Talking Ma.ch., 297 F. 791
Brown and Allen v. Jacobs Pharmacy, 57 LRA
547
Federal Trade v. Cement Institute, 68 S. Ct. 793,
333 u.s. 683
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35

But brief mention of the prima facie elements of
the conspiracy need be mentioned; but each defendant
before the court prior to the verdict is inescapably
tied in. :Jlany of the things done might have been
lawful ha.d they not been a part of a pattern or plan
for concerted action, but the evidence shows unmistakably the plan of all.
Also as a property in the drama enacted, there is
a great principle for \Yhich many people fight today
called free enterprise. It is under this system that
people a.re encouraged to make their own way without
fear or favor. Price-fixing has ever been looked on
with abhorrence by our system of law, except in short
periods of history when people who do not believe
really in free enterprise have the upper hand in democratic government.

But in the end, the tyranny is

cast down as was so recently done with what has been
so grossly mis-named the '' F:ai_r Trade Practice Acts.''

Schwegman Bros. v. Calvert Corp·., 340 U.S. 925,
71 S. Ct. 491
The ten conspirators in this law suit went out
to destroy a business which was run on the oldfashioned principle of American competition.

That

respondent did not adhere to fixed prices was abhorrent to the appellants. Yet who can deny that price
competition is not of the very essence of a free
capitalistic competitive

economy~
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That there was a conspiracy to fix prices, and
that each of the defendants was tied in, is demonstrated from the following :
D·efendants Nevins, ZCMI, Royle, the Paris Co.
were all concerned about the price policy of respondent
and had had conversations with concerned persons
by the 12th day of De-cember.
Flint had sent his man 'to warn Uptown not to
cut prices as the latter was being watched, but Uptown
did its own business as usual only to have th:at same
man return on December 11th to state Flint required
them to make it right. (R. 751)
At a meeting two days later between respondent's
four officers and Flint, respondent's price-cutting practices were reviewed, and Flint warned Uptown's officers it would be destroyed within 90 days if it didn't
quit cutting prices. (R. 756, 1017) The boycott commenced immediately under the leadership of Mr. Flint
an~ Mr. Dreyfous. Note the succession of events all
occurring within the next sixty days:
1.

Flint's cancellation of Kelvinator, Bendix, and

Fouler lines was announced by him on December 16th
and the merchandise was substantially out by Christmas.· (R. 768)
2. Flint and defendant Nevins visited Bennett of
ZCMI (who had supplied Uptown with E:asy washeTs)
the next day and discussed respondent's price cutting.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37
Bennett, NeYins, nor Flint liked it. Flint told of his
ter1nination. Easy "rashers \Yere removed within five
days from Upto,vn, and the ZC~II persons effecting the
cancellation stated it 'Yas all the doings of Flint. (R..
773, 10~2)
3. The Graybar Hotpoint man called on Uptown
on December 22nd announcing that Nevins had called
the manager about his supplying Uptown with merchandise and that ·another supplier had done the same. (R.
2080) He den1anded that the Pierpont store be closed
as a condition of future supply by Graybar. Inducements were suggested if Uptown would so close the
warehouse. It did close the warehouse immediately, only
to have the same company return on J anua.ry 4th to
announce that Uptown could sell no merchandise except at suggested retail prices. This mandate was not
confined to Graybar merchandise but applied to all. (R.
1159) Defendants Nevins and the Paris Co. were large
Hotpoint aceounts.
4. Defendants R.oyle and Nevin's man Crowton
each called the Salt Lake Hardware complaining about
the pricing of records by Uptown. (944A.)
5. Dreyfous of the Paris Co. decided to call a meeting of the dealers to see what they could do about Uptown's price policy. The testimony shows the moth-eaten
cloak of fair-trade laws "\Vas hoped to be a shield for the
c-onspiratorial gathering, but the conspirators could not
anticipate that the U. S. Supreme Court would take the
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cloak from their sinful skins leaving them in the Hotel
Utah meeting doing just what their eminent lawyer Mr.
Nebeker told them they were doing, committing conspiracy. (R. 997) The subject of the meeting was pricefixing unadulterated, :and what they could do to bring
it about. They decided to send the man who had ·called
the meeting to the Victor record supplier of Uptown
and he certainly put the pressure on. (R. 598, 997)
This was Mr. Dreyfous of the defendant Paris Co. They
all put the pressure on, telling Mr. Earl that if he did
not cease selling Uptown they would require him under
the fair trade law to buy back their large inventories
amounting to about $80,000.00, or they would flood the
market 'at great discounts which would destroy his business. Bigelow ealled Earl three times in one day urging
cancellation. Earl succumbed. A week after the meeting,
they had r~n Uptown out of the ·sale of Victor records
and the dealer defendants applauded. (R. 601 to 606)
But that was not enough.
6. Mr. Bennett of ZCMI voluntarily, and no doubt
at the prompting of Mr. Flint, did his additional and
hurtful part and phoned the President of the defendant Salt Lake Hardware advising the latter of the
discount policies of U pto\\'"n, stating to Mr. Wheeler
that Uptown's policy of price reductions was "disrupting.'' A more telling, conspiratorial word could not
have been used by Bennett (R. 1914) Wheeler said Uptown ''upset the market.'' This \\T!as no innocent call.
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7. On January :20th the rest of the records went
out, together \vith Stromberg Carlson Radio, leaving
only RCA radio instruments and Hotpoint appliances
as major lines.
8. On Febn1ary 7th the representative of Defendant Graybar cancelled out Uptown's privilege to purchase Hotpoint even on a C.O.D. basis, (R. 790, 793)
knowing at the time this would mean that respondent
could get no other merchandise, and knowing that each
of the other suppliers had removed their merchandise !
Indeed Flint \Yas right. If the respondent corporation
did not reform its co1npetitive price policy it would be
destroyed, except that under the generalship of himself
aided by Jules Dreyfous, Vice-President of the Paris
Company, and also by Nevins, Royle, Bigelow, Graybar's people, Bennett, and Salt Lake Hardware, it didn't
take that 90 days. It is true, a coffin was pl~aced in the
window of the respondent to announce to its friends that
it \Vas no more to serve the public. That coffin is in
the ground and \Yill remain until a new trail is given,
and a jury of American citizens realize that injustice
has been done. Possibly the respondent may not have
the power to pursuade another jury any better than it
did the last~ but the trial court saw and heard the fascinating drama and could come to but one conclusion at
the end of the case, that a new trial was required in
order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
I

Certainly this court will not substitute its judg/
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ment for that of one who saw so much and said appropriate words in his order ,granting 1a new trial.

V.alotis v. Utah Apex Mining 184 P. 802.
The meeting at the Hotel Utah was not, as of old,
as stated in Ball v. Paramownt, 169 F2 317, "the picture of conspiracy as a meeting by twilight of a trio of
sinister persons with pointed hats close together.'' It
was, in terms of the law of this land a bald, unconscionable group of appliance dealers meeting for the unholy
express purpose of eliminating Uptown Appliance as a
competitor a.s it refused to join in illegal pricing of merchandise.
The conspirators claimed immunity under the cloak
of a fair trade law that has been thrown out as contrevening the Sherm'an Anti-trust Act, 15, U.S.C.l. No'v
that the fair trade law is no more, the mask is off. The
appellants must answer for their illegal, conspiratorial
meeting as though the fair trade law had never been
passed. Indeed, as stated in 11 Am. Jur. 828.
Since an unconstitutional la'v is void, the
general principles follow that it imposes no
duties, confers no rights, creates no office, bestows no power or authority on anyone, affords
no · protection, and justifies no acts performed
under it.
·
When these dealer defendants met to conspire the
downfall of respondent, they met at their peril and
were fore-warned by their own counsel. (R. 997) The
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trial court clearly mandated that they should again
ans,Yer for their wrong.
III
THE GRANTING OF A NEW TRIAL WAS NEITHER
ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, NOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BUT WAS BASED ON A SOUND EXERCISE OF
LEGAL AUTHORITY.

The last point labored by appellant is that the trial
court abused its discretion in granting respondents a
new trial. Irrelevant matters in the record are referred
to, to obfuscate the real issues involved in the use of
the trial court's discretion. The question of law involved
in the use of the trial court's wide powers is easy of
understanding, although appellant's brief is entirely
absent of any help to the court on the subject.
Throughout all the cases, the courts have given
wide power to the trial court to grant the new trial provided the ''record discloses substantial evidence in support of the conclusion that has been reached by the
trial court in that respect. ''
Nelson v. Ang-elus Hospital Assn., 72 P2d 169.
While the King case suggests the same test, it is
noted that in the Stack v. Kearns decision supra, this
court stated that where there appears in the record competent evidence which would support a yerdict in favor
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of a party moving for a new trial, there is no abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in granting the
motion on that ground.
The courts have uniform~ally held that
where a new trial has been granted on the
grounds of insuffiency of the evidence, the action of the trial judge is conclusive on the appellate court, unless there has been an abuse of
discretion . . . because the trial judge must
weigh and consider the evidence of both parties
and determine for itself the just conclusion to
be drawn from it; and it is the duty of such
court to grant a new trial if not legally satisfied with the decision.

Hwnlon D .. and 8. v. So. Pac., 92 Cal. App. 230,
268 P. 385 as cited in Prout v. Perkins, 69
P2d 194
rhe Utah Supreme Court in the King case, supra,
also quoted with approval from Tell. v. Campden Fire
Ins. Assn. 1 Cal. App. 2d 625, 37 P2d 131 a~ follows:
If there is any appreciable conflict ... action
of the court in granting a new trial is conclusive on the appellate court.
The courts indulge a presumption in favor of ·the
proper exercise by the court below of its judicial discretion in granting a new trial upon the ground of the
insufficiency of the evidence to support the decision.

Prout v. Perkins, 69 P2d 194
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The lTtah Supre1ne Court held in 1919 In Valiotis
v. Utah-.A.pex lllining Co. 184 P 802 that
,,. .hile the trial c.ourt may, as '''"e have seen,
revievv the evidence, consider its weight and
the credibility of "itnesses, and grant a new
trial, if satisfied that there is a marked and
clear preponderance of the evidence against the
Yerdict, it is quite generally held that an appellate court has no such jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, there is great and convincing
evidenee of a conspiracy. It vYas predicted by Flint: he
said if respondent did not cease cutting prices, it would
be destroyed. Respondent was destroyed in precisely
the way Flint had stated, 'and by the dealer defendants
with the aid of certain distributor defendants of which
he was one. Certainly the respondent's factual presentation before the trial court satisfies the test of ''substantial'' evidence, as well as the later test applied by
this eourt in the Stack case that there must simply be
''competent evidence'' which would support a verdict
in favor of respondent. The record would certainly
and ·without question support a verdict in respondent's
favor. There was no abuse of discretion, although ap:pellant would drag in irrelevant matters in an effort to
cloud the simple issue before this court. The matter of
the trail court's alleged bias, treated in the latter part
of appellants' brief as stated on page 67 of their brief
'' vvas overcome by the verdict of the jury'' and should
not further be labored. The court had the right and
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duty to grant. a new trial if it felt justice was not done
in the first trial.
In Prout v. Perkins, 69 P2, 194 at page 195 the California court laid down the rule as to abuse of discretion as follows :
When, therefore, an appeal is taken from
an order granting a new trial on this ground,
it is incumbent upon the appellant to show that
the trial judge abused the discretion lodged
with him and this can rarely he done except"
by showing that there is no evidence which
would have supported a verdict · for the respondent.

_ Hanlon Drydock v. Southern Pac., 268 P. 385
Appellant would undertake to discredit respondent's
evidence of conspiracy on various grounds. However,
it must be admitted that in the language of the Stack
case, supra, there was ''competent'' evidence, and in
the language of a host of other cases heretofore cited,
there was ''substantial'' evidence that defendants got
together to achieve a cessation of respondent cutting
pr1ces.
The fact still remains that Mr. Flint took essential
lines from respondent, and delibrately went with Nevins
to Bennett and so told Bennett, the latter immediately
thereafter terminating sales of Easy washers. Bennett,
after attending the Hotel Utah meeting, wa.s primarily
responsible for Uptown losing Decca records because
of his call to the President of Salt Lake Hardware, the
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latter company undertaking to help along the conspiracy
by phoning the credit connection of Uptown, the StrevellPaterson Finance Company and discouraging business
with a firm cutting' pric~. The Paris Co., through its
vice president, gave Flint evidence of price-cutting on
a Zenith radio which helped to precipitate the fateful
meeting of Decen1ber 12th wherein Flint admonished
respondents on price-cutting, predicting their downfall.
All the defendants in the suit contributed to that downfall. Certainly there is some evidence, some competent
evidence, some substantial evidence, enough evidence,
to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff against each defe_ndant. And this quantum of evidence in the record is
sufficient to deprive the trial court of any claimed
arbitrary or capricious action. Its granting a new trial
should not, nor indeed cannot, under the circumstances
be disturbed.
EFFECT OF DISMISSAL oF SoME DEFENDANTS

Appellants take the erroneous view that because
the trial court excluded certain defendants from its
order granting a new trial that in a new trial e':idence
concerning the dismissed person's connection in the conspiracy will be inadmissable hearsay. They cite .not a
single case to the court to prove the point, and there is
none. The fact remains that even though the trial court
let ZCMI out of the conspiracy, the acts of Mr. Bennett

i

are admissible, if he can be tied in as a confederate,
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erate must be equally guilty at law with a conspirator.
The law of admissability ·of evidence of co-conspirators
does not require such to be charged with crime, or with
conspiracy. The question is: Were the acts and declarations made in pursuance of the common design and
before the consumation of its purpose~ If so, the words
and acts are admissible against those charged. The conversations between Flint and Bennett will always be
admissible, whether ZCMI is a defendant or not. If a
conspiracy is proven, those who act to further its purpose whether charged with crime ·or civil consequences,
are confederates; and their words and acts are admissible against the other co-conspirators, even though
such words and acts were uttered out of the presence
of the other co-conspirators.

Standard Oil v. Doyle, 82 S.W. 271.
Samara v. United States, 263 F. 12, (2nd circuit)
Peop.Ze v. Ferlin, 265 P. 230 (Calif.)
2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th Ed., 1194
1

Jones on Evidence, 4th Ed., 482
CONCLUSION

Respondent submits that the position taken by appellant is without merit, and that the ne'v trial granted
by the trial court should go on without delay. Appellants have cited no law' to support their position.
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spondent has cited a host of cases, all representing the
overwhelming authority back of the trial court's ~action,
which in no event should be disturbed.
WARWICK

C.

LAMOREAUX,

RAwLINGs, WALLAcE, BLAcK, RoBERTs AND BLAcK,

Attorneys for Respondent
JULY

1951
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